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persons for any act of negligence, unless there is a duty owing
from the agent to the third person.
Andrew J. S. Jumonville

CIvIL LAW PROPERTY -

APPORTIONMENT OF ALLUVION

BETWEEN RIPARIAN OWNERS

Over a period of years alluvion formed along the shore of
the adjacent riparian properties of plaintiff and defendant. At
one time the Mississippi River made a large loop around the
alluvion, but its course was diverted in 1933, and from that time
the main channel of the river has lain along only one side of the
alluvion. Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment apportioning
the alluvion, contending it should be divided by the acreage
method which would mean that each riparian owner would be
given acreage in the alluvion in proportion to the original river
frontage that each owned. In rejecting this contention the district court held that each proprietor should receive new river
frontage in the same proportion as each proprietor's old river
frontage had borne to the total old river frontage. The district
court's holding' was affirmed by the court of appeal but on
writ of certiorari to the Louisiana Supreme court, held, reversed. When alluvion which has formed in front of the estates
of riparian proprietors is to be divided the court must take each
case as it is presented and order apportionment by the method
which will most nearly give each owner a fair proportion of
the new acreage and a fair proportion of the new frontage. This
can best be accomplished here by giving each riparian owner
acreage in the alluvion in proportion to the original river frontage that each owned. Jones v. Houge, 129 So.2d 194 (La. 1961).
By the principle of accession, the accretions which form successively and imperceptibly to the soil situated on the shore of
1. Another issue of considerable interest in the case was the question of the
time at which the apportionment should be made. The extent of the alluvion at
various periods of its growth was described by five successive surveys made by
the United States Corps of Engineers and the defendant contended that the
alluvion should be divided as it was represented in the various surveys. The trial
court adopted the defendant's increment method of division. The court of appeal
reversed the holding on this issue and the Supreme Court affirmed the holding
of the court of appeal stating: "It is our opinion that courts must and should
accept the extent and area of an alluvial deposit as it exists, be it much or little,
at the time the apportionment between riparian owners is sought." Jones v. Hogue,
129 So. 2d 194, 199 (La. 1961).
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a river belong to the owner of the shore on which they form.2
This principle is incorporated in Roman law,3 the French Civil
Code, 4 and the Louisiana Civil Code. 5 Article 516 of the Civil
Code" is unique, however, in that it is the first reference to the
division of alluvion embodied in any of the above mentioned
codes. 7 However, this article, while referring to the method of
division, was vague in its meaning and application." The two
methods which have received attention in the Louisiana cases

are the acreage and frontage methods.9 Under the acreage
2. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 509 (1870) : "The accretions, which are formed successively and imperceptibly to any soil situated on the shore of a river or other
stream, are called alluvion. The alluvion belongs to the owner of the soil situated
on the edge of the water, whether it be a river or stream, and whether the same
be navigable or not, who is bound to leave public that portion of the bank which
is required by law for the public use."
3. INSTITUTEs 2.1.20: "And further, what a river adds to your field by alluvio
is by the Jus Gentium acquired by you. And by alluvio is meant a latent increase;
and an addition by alluvio is an addition so gradual as to be at each moment
imperceptible."
4. FRENcH CIVIL CODE arts. 556-558 (Cachard transl. 1930).
5. See note 2 supra.
6. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 516 (1870). Adopted without comment in the Projet
of the Revised Civil Code of 1825, 1 LOUISIANA LEGAL ARClIlvEs 48 (1937).
7. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 516 (1870) : "If an alluvion be formed in front of the
property of several riparian proprietors, the division is to be made according to
the extent of the front line of each at the time of the formation of the alluvion."
Also compare the oirginal French version of the corresponding LA. CIVIL CODE
art. 508 (1825) : "S'il se forme une alluvion en face de plusieurs propridts
riveraines, le partage s'en efra entre leurs propidtaires, suivant l'dtendue ou la
face de l'heritage que chacun d'euxr possedait sur la rivilre, lors de la formation
de cette alluvion."
8. See Zengel, Elements of the Law of Ownership, in 3 WEST'S L.S.A. - CIVIL
CODE 1, 14 (1950), which states: "[T]he new land formed by alluvion is divided
among the riparian owners according to the extent of the front line of each at
the time of the formation of the alluvion." This language is susceptible of at least
four applications. The portion of the new area to be allocated to each adjoining
landowner could be determined (1) by applying to the total new area the ratio
of the frontage of each tract to the total frontage along which the new area is
formed; or (2) by projecting the boundary lines of each tract along their existing
directions into the new area; or (3) by projecting the boundary lines of each tract
into the new area in directions which are perpendicular to the thread. of the river
or stream; or (4) by dividing the water edge of the new area in the same proportions as the original bank of the stream, and by joining with straight lines the
corresponding segments of the new and old banks.
9. See note 10 infra and accompanying text. The frontage method has generally been adopted by the common law jurisdictions of the United States.
Johnston v. Jones, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 209 (1862) ; Stull v. United States, 61
F.2d 826 (8th Cir. 1932) ; Hamilton v. Horan, 193 Ark. 85, 97 S.W.2d 637
(1936) ; Malone v. Mobbs, 102 Ark. 542, 145 S.W. 193 (1912) ; Kehr v. Snyder,
114 Ill. 313, 2 N.E. 68 (1885) ; Deering v. Gahm, 248 Iowa 100, 84 N.W.2d 223
(1957) ; Soloman v. Sioux City, 243 Iowa 634, 51 N.W.2d 472 (1952) ; Todd v.
Murdock, 230 Iowa 1121, 300 N.W. 284 (1941) ; Stark v. Meriwether, 98 Kan.
10, 157 Pac. 438 (1916) ; Allen v. Wood, 256 Mass. 343, 152 N.E. 617 (1926) ;
Board of Supervisors v. Giles, 219 Miss. 245, 68 So.2d 483 (1953) ; Doebbeling
v. Hall, 310 Me. 204, 274 S.W. 1049 (1925) ; Batchelder v. Keniston, 51 N.H.
496 (1872) ; Gardner v. Green, 67 N.D. 268, 271 N.W. 775 (1937) ; O'Donnell v.
Kelsey, 10 N.Y. 412 (1852) ; Goihns v. Merryman, 183 Okla. 166, 80 P.2d 268
(1938) ; Hathaway v. Milwaukee, 132 Wis. 249, 111 N.W. 570 (1907) ; Graham
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method each riparian proprietor would receive an area of the
alluvion in the same proportion that each owned original river
frontage. The frontage method distributes to each riparian
owner the same proportionate frontage that he owned on the
original shore line. Heirs of Delord v. New Orleans, ° the earliest
reported Louisiana case to interpret Article 516 of the Civil
Code, prescribed the acreage method of division. Although the
acreage method was utilized in that case, the court stressed the
fact that both of the parties' access to the river should be maintained." When presented with this question again in Newell v.
Leathers,'12 the court applied the frontage method of division,
stating that it did not consider this method as being different
from that prescribed in the Delord case.' 3 However, in the more
v. Knight, 240 S.W. 981 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922). See 2 WALSH, COMMENTARIES
OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 543, § 227 (1947). However, a substantial
number of common law jurisdictions have held that apportionment is to be made
by extending a line from the point of intersection of the original property line
and the bank perpendicular to the shore line or to the thread of the stream. Wells
v. Bailey, 55 Conn. 292, 10 Atl. 565 (1887) ; Turk v. Wilson's Heirs, 266 Ky.
78, 98 S.W.2d 4 (1936) ; Tappan v. Boston Water-Power Co., 157 Mass. 24,
31 N.E. 703 (1892) ; State v. 6.0 Acres of Land, 101 N.H. 228, 139 A.2d 75
(1958) ; Manchester v. Point Street Iron Works, 13 R.I. 355 (1881) ; Jansky
v. City of Two Rivers, 227 Wis. 228, 278 N.W. 527 (1938); Cunningham v.
Prevow, 28 Tenn. App. 643, 192 S.W.2d 338 (1945). A minority of cases have
extended the property line to the alluvial shore line, regardless of the direction of
the property line. Stockley v. Cissna, 119 Fed. 812 (6th Cir. 1902) ; Gorton v.
Rice, 153 Mo. 676, 55 S.W. 241 (1900); Cramer v. Perine, 241 N.Y. 177, 167
N.E. 213 (1929); Hubbard v. Manwell, 60 Vt. 235, 14 Atl. 693 (1888); McCamon v. Stagg, 2 Kan. App. 479, 43 Pac. 86 (1896). Many common law jurisdictions have supported the principle that one method of division will not be
followed when the result is inequitable. See Stark v. Meriwether, 98 Kan. 10,
15, 157 Pac. 438, 442 (1916), where the court stated: "[T]he proper method or
rule for apportioning accretions on rivers . . . depends upon varying circumstances
and conditions so that it is impracticable to state a general rule that will apply
in all cases." Accord, Peoria v. Central National Bank, 224 Ill. 43, 79 N.E. 296
(1906) ; Elgin v. Beckwith, 119 Ill. 367, 10 N.E. 558 (1887) ; Smith v. Leavenworth, 101 Miss. 238, 57 So. 803 (1911) ; Frederitzie v. Boeker, 193 Mo. 228, 92
S.W. 227 (1907) ; Cramer v. Perine, 241 N.Y. 177, 167 N.E. 213 (1929) ; Thornton v. Grant, 10 R.I. 477 (1873).
10. 11 La. Ann. 699 (1856).
11. Id. at 700.
12. 50 La. Ann. 162, 23 So. 243 (1897).
13. There seems to be some doubt as to the meaning of the Delord case by
virtue of the language in the Newell case, which states: "We do not interpret
Delord v. City of New Orleans . . . as establishing a different rule." 50 La. Ann.
162, 165, 23 So. 243, 246 (1897). Compare with the language of the Delord case,
which prescribes that "the line of such division must be drawn in such manner as
that each . . . shall have such a proportion of the alluvial soil as the total extent
of his front line bears to the total quantity of the alluvial soil to be divided."
11 La. Ann. 699, 700 (1856).
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recent case of Alcard v. Shreveport,14 the court, without mentioning the Newell decision, reverted to the acreage method applied in the Delord case.
In attempting to apportion the alluvion equitably, the court
in the instant case utilized the acreage method of division.15 It
is emphasized in the decision that, in the division of alluvion
between riparian proprietors, two objects are to be attained:
"(1) each owner should receive a fair proportion of the area
of the alluvion, and (2) each should receive a fair proportion
of the new frontage on the water."1 Considering these two
objects and stating that it did not regard Article 516 of the
Civil Code as prescribing an exclusive method for the apportionment of alluvion,17 the court considered the acreage method of
division to be most equitable.' 8
Thus it seems that although the Louisiana cases have applied
different methods of division, they are not in conflict since they
accomplish the basic principle of the article "to do justice between the parties."' 9 Furthermore, it would seem that the
court's reluctance to prescribe an exclusive method for the apportionment of alluvion is most fortunate because of the different objects that must be considered in cases of this nature. Alluvion formations will differ from one case to another; add to
this the changing interests of the riparian property owners and
it can readily be seen that inequitable results would attach to
any exclusive rule that the court might adopt.2 0 In view of the
14. 196 La. 714, 200 So. 14 (1941).
15. Jones v. Hogue, 129 So.2d 194, 203 (La. 1960) : "We think it would be
equitable and proper in this case to order a division of the alluvion on the area
basis in proportion to the respective frontage of each of the riparian owners."
(Emphasis added.)
16. Id. at 202: "Because of the varying conditions which obtain in different
cases, no one method of effecting a division can be prescribed . . . . [T]he courts
can therefore do no more than take each case as it is presented and order an
apportionment by the method which will most nearly attain these two objects and
do justice between the parties to the particular case."
17. See note 16 aupra.
18. Id. at 203: "In the instant case river frontage, for all practical purposes,
Is not of much importance . . . [T]he U.S. engineers in 1933 diverted the main
channel of the river to some extent away from the properties . . . . (T] here is no
showing that river frontage here has any importance for commerce or navigation."
19. See note 16 aupra.
20. In the instant case the Mississippi River had been diverted and the parties
had little or no interest in maintaining their access to the river, but where
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interests of the riparian owners and the diversity of circumstances that attach to problems of this nature, it is felt that the
court's liberal interpretation of Article 516 of the Civil Code
will bring about more just and equitable results in allocation of
alluvion between riparian proprietors in the future.
D. Mark Bienvenu

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

CENSORSHIP OF MOTION PICTURE

FILMS

A Chicago ordinance required submission of motion picture

films to the Commissioner of Police in order to obtain a permit
for public exhibition." Petitioner was denied a permit for public

exhibition of the film "Don Juan" on refusal to submit the film
to the Commissioner. Petitioner challenged the ordinance on the
grounds that requiring submission of all films prior to public
exhibition rendered the ordinance an unconstitutional prior restraint,2 contending that all prior restraints on motion picture
riparian property is on a major navigable body of water the property owners'
interest in maintaining access to such a watercourse can be significantly valuable.
A

B

RIVER

RIVER

Figure 1
F1sure 2
In Figure I riparian proprietors A and B own equal portions of original
shore line. It can readily be seen that by using the area method of division, as
represented by line xy, B's access to the river is substantially decreased, while
A's shoreline is substantially increased. In Figure 2 riparian proprietor A has
three times as much shoreline as B. Using the frontage method of division, as
represented by line xz, will result in an inequitable distribution of the alluvial
area.
1. MUNICIPAL CODE OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO § 155-4 authorizes the Commissioner of Police to refuse to issue a permit when a film is "immoral or obscene,
or portrays depravity, criminality, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens of any
race, color, creed, or religion and exposes them to contempt, derision, or obloquy,
or tends to produce a breach of the peace or riots, or purports to represent any
banging, lynching, or burning of a human being."
2. A prior restraint is generally defined as interfering "by censorship or injunction before the words are spoken or printed." 2 SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTioNAL LAw 1030 (1938).

